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ADOPTION RECORDS REFORM: IMPACT
ON ADOPTEES
I. INTRODUCTION
"I feel cut off from the rest of humanity ... I want to
know who I am ... I have no ancestry. Nothing."1 Sharing
these sentiments, adult adoptees throughout the United
States have mobilized an effective advocacy force2 for open
adoption records.3 Nearly all states have statutes requiring
courts to seal the child's original birth certificate and all
records of the adoption proceeding.4 Access can only be ob-
1. Linda F.M. v. Department of Health, 52 N.Y.2d 236, 238, 418 N.E.2d 1302,
1304 (adopted woman's desire to learn the identity of her natural parents and her
ancestry did not by itself meet the statutory prerequisite of good cause needed to open
sealed records), cert. dismissed sub nom., Mason v. Abrams, 454 U.S. 806 (1981).
2. For example, the Adoptees' Liberty Movement Association (ALMA), founded
in 1971 by adoptee Florence Fisher, boasts a membership of 20,000. A primary goal
of the organization is the repeal of sealed adoption records statutes. Also active is
Yesterday's Children, an Illinois-based advocacy organization for adoption reform.
3. Sealed records have several connotations. Adoption agencies maintain records
on birth parents and adoptive parents which are consolidated and sealed at the time
of the adoption. Agency policies vary, but generally nonidentifying information from
these files has been available to adoptees and their adoptive parents. The sealed court
file, on the other hand, generally contains the child's original birth certificate which
has been removed from the vital statistics files and sealed separately. A. SOROSKY, A.
BARAN & R. PANNOR, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 19-20 (1978).
Currently only two states allow an adult adoptee to inspect his or her original
birth certificate without a court older. ALA. CODE § 26-10-4 (1975); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-2423 (1980). Two other states allow adult adoptees to review adoption records
without a court order. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34-25-16.4 (1977), 25-6-15
(1976); VA. CODE § 63.1-236 (1980).
4. ALA. CODE § 26-10-5 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.150(b) (Supp. 1982); ARIZ.
STAT. ANN. § 36-326B (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-217 (Supp. 1981); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 227 (West 1982); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 10435, 10439 (West
1982 & Supp. 1983); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-4-104 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7-53, 45-68m (West 1981 & Supp. 1983-1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 923-24
(1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-311 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.162, 382.22 (West
Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-417 (1981); HAwAII REV. STAT. §§ 578-14, -15
(1976 & Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 16-1511 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1522
(Smith-Hurd 1980), ch. 111 1/2, § 73.17 (Smith-Hurd 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-
1-12 (Burns 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16 (West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
2423 (1980); Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.570 (Baldwin 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:73, 40:78, 46:56G (West Supp. 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 534 (Supp.
1982-83); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 19(b) (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 13
(West Supp. 1983-84); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15 (Callaghan 1980), § 27.3178 (Supp.
1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.1761 (West Supp. 1981); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-17-
25, -31 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.120 (Vernon 1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-
126 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-113 (1978); NEv. REv. STAT. § 9:3-52, 26:8-40.1
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tained with a court order 5 upon a showing of good cause.6
Seeking to liberalize the law,7 adopted persons have pursued
legislative reform,8 attacked the constitutionality of state
(West Supp. 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170Bfi9 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:3:31
(West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-16 (1978); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114 (McKin-
ney 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48.25(a) (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16
(1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60-
17 (West 1966); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 7.211, 432.415, 432.420 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 2905 (Purdon Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-21 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-7-1780(b), -1790(E) (Law. Co-op. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15
(1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-130, -132 (1977); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4477, Rule 47a (Vernon Supp. 1982-83); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-15 (1977); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 449, 451-452 (1974 & Supp. 1982); VA. CODE §§ 63.1-235, -236
(1980 & Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.150 (1961); W. VA. CODE § 16-
5-18 (1979); WIS. STAT. § 48.93 (1981-82); Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-104 (1977).
5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 26-10-4 to -5 (1975 & Supp. 1982); HAWAII REv. STAT.
§ 578.15 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 16-1511 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (1980);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-4421 (Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2905 (Purdon
Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-128
(1977).
6. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.150 (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-217
(Supp. 1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10439 (West Supp. 1983) (good and
compelling cause); CAL. CIV. CODE § 227 (west 1982) ("good cause approaching the
necessitous"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-104 (1978 & Supp. 1982); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 600.16 (West 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.67 (West Supp. 1983-1984);
MINN. CODE ANN. § 93 17-25 (1973); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-213 (Supp. 1977); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 43-113 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170B:19 (1977); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3-31 (west 1976); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney 1977); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 57 (West 1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780 (Law. Co-op.
1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-16-14 (1976), § 78-30-15 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 452 (1974); VA. CODE § 63.1:2 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.32.150, .260
(1961 & Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-4 (1980); Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-104(d) (1977).
7. One commentator described the traditional adoption process as follows:
Adoption is the process by which society provides children with substitute
families when the natural parent-child relationship has failed. This statutorily
created process terminates the legal relationship between natural parents and
their child, relieving the former of all parental rights and duties, and creating a
new relationship between the child and the adoptive parents. When a child is
adopted, a new birth certificate containing the name of the adoptive parents is
issued. The child's original birth certificate, and, in most states, the court
records of adoption proceedings, the adoption order and the adoption agency
files are sealed.
Comment, Confirming the Constitutionality of Sealing Adoption Records, 46 BROOK-
LYN L. REv. 717, 717 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
8. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-68b to -68m (1972 & West Supp.
1983-1984), as revised by 1977 Conn. Pub. Acts 77-246, §§ 1-15, 1980 Conn. Pub. Acts
80-476 §§ 158-168, and 1981 Conn. Pub. Acts 81-40 § 1, 81-472 § 148; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 259.46 - .49 (1982), as revised by 1982 Minn. Laws 584 §§ 1-5.
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statutes9 and sought judicially expanded definitions of good
cause.'
0
However, adoptees' attempts at reform have come up
against traditional notions of secrecy in the adoption pro-
cess." Proponents of secrecy argue that assurances of confi-
dentiality made to birth parents at the time of the adoption
require deference to their need for privacy.12 Confidential
records and new birth certificates are thought to give adop-
tive families the freedom to develop bonds without interfer-
9. See, e.g., ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.) (sealed adoption
records statutes did not violate thirteenth and fourteenth amendments), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 995 (1979) ; In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1978) (sealed records
statutes did not violate adult adoptee's first amendment right to receive information);
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646
(1977) (sealed records statutes did not violate adult adoptee's right to privacy because
only personal rights deemed fundamental are constitutionally protected).
10. See, e.g., Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1979) (right to inherit from
birth parents held to be good cause); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978)
(psychological need to know without proof of mental health problem not sufficient for
good cause showing).
11. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 89 Misc. 2d 132, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1976):
Confidentiality and the sealing of records. . . encourages and facilitates
investigation into factors relevant to planning adoption by preventing the pub-
lic disclosure of embarrassing personal facts about the parties involved ....
[It] assure[s] that natural parents will not be able to locate the child and inter-
fere in his relationship with his adoptive parents . . . . [It] also protects
adopted children who are illegitimate from any possible stigma they might
otherwise have to bear because of their birth . . . . [It] assures the natural
mother. . . "[who has given birth to an illegitimate child] that her indiscretion
will not be divulged."
Id. at 133-34, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (quoting People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309
(1955)). See also A. SoRosKy, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 3, at 37-38.
12. Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310, 1315 (T a. 1979) (court held that privacy
right of birth parent depends on whether agency made assurances of confidentiality).
But see Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 317 n.7,
372 A.2d 646, 654 n.7 (1977) (court held that if agency notifies birth parent at time of
adoption that his or her identity will be revealed if adoptee requests, notice constitutes
consent to disclosure).
One author suggests the following characterization of the traditional adoption
agency stance:
Adoption agencies have insisted that the birth mother's permanent ano-
nymity and privacy were vital to her survival. She had sinned and suffered,
paid dearly, and deserved to be left alone. No one had a right to barge into her
life and ruin it; she had been promised freedom from fear, and the adoption
agency could not violate this sacred oath.
A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 3, at 50.
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ence from the past.' 3 The state has also perceived closed
records as an essential ingredient promoting stability in
adoptive families and integrity in the adoption system. '4
Wisconsin's recently enacted adoption reform statutes15
strive to balance the interests of all parties to adoption. The
legislature responded to pressure from reform advocates16 by
amending the statutes relating to preadoption court reports
and postadoption disclosure of information. Three major
revisions have occurred. First, in anticipation of the adop-
tion proceedings, a comprehensive report must be filed with
the court at the hearing to terminate parental rights.' 7 The
report must contain the medical and genetic history of the
birth parents and other relatives, the results of a recent medi-
cal examination of the parents, a description of the prenatal
care and birth condition of the child and a statement of any
other relevant medical or genetic history about the child.' 8
Second, the statute requires the Department of Health and
Social Services (DHSS) to maintain a centralized confiden-
tial file of the medical and genetic information provided in
13. See Comment, Confidentiality ofAdoption Records An Examination, 52 TUL.
L. REv. 817 (1978), in which the author asserts that the constitutionally recognized
right of a parent to the care, custody and control of his or her child protects adoptive
parents, therefore the state must show a compelling interest in order to interfere with
the adoptive parents' fundamental right to rear their child. Id. at 832.
14. See Comment, The Arizona Adoption Records Statute: A Call for Reform,
1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 469, 473 (the state has an interest in protecting the adoption pro-
cess because adoption provides homes for children who would otherwise be home-
less); Note, Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Pri;'acy of the
Natural Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. Ray. 451, 471-73 (1982) (the state has several inter-
ests which are served by sealed records: promoting adoption as an institution by pro-
tecting privacy of birth parent; providing atmosphere conducive to full disclosure of
information by birth parents; preventing needless disruption of adoptive family).
15. Act of May 6, 1982, ch. 359, 1981 Wis. Laws 1497.
16. Several Wisconsin adoption advocacy groups were instrumental in lobbying
for legislative reform. Among them are the Open Door Society, the Adoption Infor-
mation Directory (AID), and the Adoptive Parents Association of Greater
Milwaukee.
17. Wisconsin provides a bifurcated procedure for the termination of parental
rights. Wis. STAT. §§ 48.424, .427 (1981-82). At the factfinding hearing the trier of
fact must determine whether the grounds exist for termination under either section
48.41 or section 48.415. If grounds are found, the court must hear evidence related to
dispositional alternatives. Id. § 48.424(4). One of the dispositional alternatives is an
order permanently terminating parental rights. Id. § 48.427(4).
18. Act of May 6, 1982, ch. 359, § 5, 1981 Wis. Laws 1498 (codified at Wis. STAT.
§ 48.425(l)(am) (1981-82)).
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the court reports. 19 Third, various avenues of access to this
information are open to adult adoptees, adoptive parents,
the guardian or custodian of an adopted child, the adult off-
spring of an adoptee or social workers providing adoption
services.2 0 Nonidentifying information is generally available
to these parties upon request.2 1 Identifying information may
19. Act of May 6, 1982, ch. 359, § 8, 1981 Wis. Laws 1498 (codified at Wis. STAT.
§ 48.432(2)(a) (1981-82)), provides:
(2) (a) The department shall maintain all information obtained under s.
48A27 (6)(b) in a centralized birth record file.
(b) Any birth parent whose rights to a child have been terminated in this
state at any time, or who consented to the adoption of a child before February
1, 1982, may file with the department any relevant medical or genetic informa-
tion about the child or the child's birth parents, and the department shall
maintain the information in the centralized birth record file.
20. Act of May 6, 1982, ch. 359, § 8, 1981 Wis. Laws 1498 (codified at Wis. STAT.
§ 48.432(3)(a) (1981-82)), provides:
(3) (a) The department shall release the medical information under sub.
(2) to any of the following persons upon request:
I. A child 18 years of age or older.
2. An adoptive parent of an adopted child.
3. The guardian or legal custodian of a child.
4. The offspring of a child if the requester is 18
years of age or older.
5. An agency or social worker assigned to provide
services to the child or place the child for adoption.
21. Act of May 6, 1982, ch. 359, § 8, 1981 Wis. Laws 1498 (codified at Wis. STAT.
§ 48.432(4), (7)-(9) (1981-82)), provides:
(4) (a) Whenever any person specified under sub. (3) wishes to obtain
medical and genetic information about a child whose birth parent's rights have
been terminated in this state at any time, or whose birth parent consented to
his or her adoption before February 1, 1982, or medical and genetic informa-
tion about the birth parents of such a child, the person may request that the
department conduct a search for the birth parents to obtain the information.
The request shall be accompanied by a statement from a physician certifying
either that the child has or may have acquired a genetically transferable dis-
ease or that the child's medical condition requires access to the information.
(b) Upon receipt of a request under par. (a), the department shall under-
take a diligent search for the child's parents. Upon request by the department,
a county agency under s. 48.56 (1) or agency licensed under s. 48.60 shall coop-
erate in the search and shall make its records available to the department. The
department may not require an agency to conduct the search, but may desig-
nate an agency to do so with the agency's consent.
(c) Employes of the department and any agency conducting a search under
this subsection may not inform any person other than the birth parents of the
purpose of the search.
(d) The department or agency designated by the department under par. (b)
shall charge the requester a reasonable fee for the cost of the search. When the
department or agency determines that the fee will exceed $100 for either birth
[Vol. 67:110
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be released if there is a filed affidavit of consent from the
birth parents or if a search by DHSS yields parental
consent. 2
parent, it shall notify the requester. No fee in excess of $100 per birth parent
may be charged unless the requester, after receiving notification under this
paragraph, has given consent to proceed with the search.
(e) The department or agency conducting the search shall, upon locating a
birth parent, notify him or her of the request and of the need for medical and
genetic information.
(f) The department shall release to the requester any medical or genetic
information provided by a birth parent under this subsection without disclos-
ing the birth parent's identity or location.
(g) If a birth parent is located but refuses to provide the information re-
quested, the department shall notify the requester, without disclosing the birth
parent's identity or location, and the requester may petition the circuit court to
order the birth parent to disclose the information. The court shall grant the
motion for good cause shown.
(7) (a) If the department or another agency that maintains records relating
to the adoption of a child or the termination of parental rights receives a report
from a physician stating that a birth parent or another child of the birth parent
has acquired or may have a genetically transferable disease, the department or
agency shall notify the child of the existence of the disease, if he or she is 18
years of age or over, or notify the child's guardian, custodian or adoptive par-
ent if the child is under age 18.
(b) If the department or agency receives a report from a physician that a
child has acquired or may have a genetically transferable disease, the depart-
ment or agency shall notify the child's birth parent of the existence of the dis-
ease.
(c) Notice under par. (a) or (b) shall be sent to the most recent address on
file with the agency or the department.
(8) Any person, including this state or any political subdivision of this
state, who participates in good faith in any requirement of this section shall
have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that results from his or her
actions. In any proceeding, civil or criminal, the good faith of any person
participating in the requirements of this section shall be presumed.
(9) The department shall adopt rules to implement this section.
22. Act of May 6, 1982, ch. 359, § 9, 1981 Wis. Laws 1500 (codified at WIs. STAT.
§ 48.433 (1981-82)), provides:
48.433 Access to identifying information about parents. (1) In this sec-
tion, "birth parent" has the meaning given under s. 48.432 (1)(a).
(2) Any birth parent whose rights have been terminated in this state at
any time, or who has consented to the adoption of his or her child in this state
before February 1, 1982, may file with the department an affidavit authorizing
the department to provide the child with his or her original birth certificate
and with any other available information about the birth parent's identity and
location. An affidavit filed under this subsection may be revoked at any time
by notifying the department in writing.
(3) Any person 21 years of age or over whose birth parent's rights have
been terminated in this state or who has been adopted in this state with the
1983]
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This comment will explore the sealed records contro-
versy and examine Wisconsin's approach to solving it. It
will include an analysis of the arguments for open records
advanced by adoptees and survey legislative and judicial re-
sponses to those arguments. Finally, it will describe the mid-
dle of the road solution embodied in chapter 359 of the Laws
of 1981.
consent of his or her birth parent or parents before February 1, 1982, may
request the department to provide the person with the following:
(a) The person's original birth certificate.
(b) Any available information regarding the identity and location of his
or her birth parents.
(4) Before acting on the request, the department shall require the re-
quester to provide adequate identification.
(5) The department shall disclose the requested information in either of
the following circumstances:
(a) The department has on file unrevoked affidavits filed under sub. (2)
from both birth parents.
(b) One of the birth parents was unknown at the time of the proceeding
for termination of parental rights or consent adoption and the known birth
parent has filed an unrevoked affidavit under sub. (2).
(6) (a) If the department does not have on file an affidavit from each
known birth parent, it shall, within 3 months after the date of the original
request, undertake a diligent search for each birth parent who has not filed an
affidavit. The search shall be completed within 6 months after the date of the
request. If any information has been provided under sub. (5), the department
is not required to conduct a search.
(b) Upon request by the department, a county department under s. 48.56
(1) or an agency licensed under s. 48.60 shall cooperate in the search and shall
make its records available to the department. The department may not require
an agency to conduct the search, but may designate an agency to do so with the
agency's consent.
(c) Employes of the department and any agency conducting a search
under this subsection may not inform any person other than the birth parents
of the purpose of the search.
(d) The department or agency designated by the department under par.
(b) shall charge the requester a reasonable fee for the cost of the search. When
the department or agency determines that the fee will exceed $100 for either
birth parent, it shall notify the requester. No fee in excess of $100 per birth
parent may be charged unless the requester, after receiving notification under
this paragraph, has given consent to proceed with the search.
(7) (a) The department or agency conducting the search shall, upon lo-
cating a birth parent, make at least one verbal contact and notify him or her of
the following:
1. The nature of the information requested.
2. The date of the request.
3. The fact that the birth parent has the right to file with the depart-
ment the affidavit under sub. (2).
[Vol. 67:110
CONFIDENTIAL ADOPTION RECORDS
II. DIMENSIONS OF THE CONTROVERSY
The dispute over confidential adoption records pits the
interests of adult adoptees against the state and the adoptive
and birth parents. The state has an interest in preserving the
integrity of the adoption process.23  Birth parents and adop-
(b) Within 3 working days after contacting a birth parent, the department
shall send the birth parent a written copy of the information specified under
par. (a) and a blank copy of the affidavit.
(c) If the birth parent files the affidavit, the department shall disclose the
requested information if permitted under sub. (5).
(d) If the department or an agency has contacted a birth parent under this
subsection, and the birth parent does not file the affidavit, the department may
not disclose the requested information.
(e) If, after a search under this subsection, a known birth parent cannot be
located, the department may disclose the requested information if the other
birth parent has fied an unrevoked affidavit under sub. (2).
(f) The department or agency conducting a search under this subsection
may not contact a birth parent again on behalf of the same requester until at
least 12 months after the date of the previous contact. Further contacts with a
birth parent under this subsection on behalf of the same requester may be
made only if 5 years have elapsed since the date of the last contact.
(8) (a) If a birth parent is known to be dead and has not filed an unre-
voked affidavit under sub. (2), the department shall so inform the requester.
The department may not provide the requester with his or her original birth
certificate or with the identity of that parent, but shall provide the requester
with any available information it has on fie regarding the identity and loca-
tion of the other birth parent if both of the following conditions exist:
1. The other birth parent has fied an unrevoked affidavit under
sub. (2).
2. One year has elapsed since the death of the deceased birth
parent.
(b) If a birth parent is known to be dead, the department, in addition to
the information provided under par. (a), shall provide the requester with any
nonidentifying social history information about the deceased parent on file
with the department.
(9) The requester may petition the circuit court to order the department
to disclose any information that may not be disclosed under this section. The
court shall grant the petition for good cause shown.
(10) Any person, including this state or any political subdivision of this
state, who participates in good faith in any requirement of this section shall
have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that results from his or her
actions. In any proceeding, civil or criminal, the good faith of any person
participating in the requirements of this section shall be presumed.
(11) The department shall adopt rules to implement this section.
23. See generally Levin, The Adoption Trilemma: The Adult Adoptee's Emerging
Searchfor His Ancestral Identity, 8 U. BALT. L. REy. 496 (1979); Comment, supra
note 14; Comment, supra note 7; Comment, Sealed Records in Adoptions: The Need
for Legislative Reform, 21 CATH. LAW. 211 (1975); Comment, Breaking the Seal- Con-
stitutional and Statutory Approaches to Adult Adoptee's Right to Identity, 75 Nw. U.L.
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tive parents assert a right to privacy which is compatible
with integrity in the adoption process.24 But advocates for
unfettered release of information cite injurious effects suf-
fered by adoptees hampered in their search for identity.
Those who favor continued restriction argue, however, that
the negative effects of disclosure far outweigh the benefits.26
A. Adoptee's Need to Know
Many observers contend that the desire for information
is universal among adoptees.2 7 The possession of history, af-
ter all, is one of the defining features of human life.28 Yet an
adopted person is cut off from his or her personal history by
a judicial proceeding.29
Emotional and psychological needs figure prominently in
an adoptee's search.3 0 Adopted persons frequently have dif-
REv. 316 (1980); Comment, supra note 13; Comment, A Step Toward Resolving the
Adoption Records Controversy: The Adoption Agency as the Key to Unlocking Sealed
Identities, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 350 (1979); Comment,Adoptees Equal Protection Rights,
28 UCLA L. REv. 1314 (1981); Comment, The Adoptee's Right of Access to Sealed
Adoption Records in North Carolina, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 563 (1980); Comment,
The Current Status of the Right ofAdultAdoptees to Know the Identity of Their Natural
Parents, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 677 (1980); Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural
Heritage, 19 N.Y. L.F. 137 (1973); Note, supra note 14; Note, The Adult Adoptee's
Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1196 (1975); Annot., 83
A.L.R.3d 800 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 48-67.
25. See, e.g., A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 3, at 97-98; Levin,
supra note 23, at 497; Comment, Sealed Records in Adoptions, supra note 23, at 218;
Note, supra note 23, at 1200.
26. See, for example, Note, supra note 14, at 471, in which the commentator as-
serts that the birth parents' fundamental right to privacy is constitutionally protected;
therefore the state can only release records when disclosure serves a compelling state
interest.
27. Comment, Sealed Records in Adoption, supra note 23, at 218.
28. Note, supra note 23, at 1200 (citing A. WHITEHEAD, MODES OF THOUGHT 46
(1938)).
29. The adoption process begins with a factfinding hearing culminating in the
voluntary or involuntary termination of the parents' rights. See, e.g., Wis. STAT.
§§ 48.41, .415 (1981-82). At the dispositional phase of the termination proceeding, the
court will usually enter an order transferring guardianship and custody of the child
pending adoption. Id. § 48.427. The final stage in the process is the hearing and
order granting adoption. Id. § 48.91.
30. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1229 (2d Cir.) (association of adult
adoptees challenge the New York statutes requiring sealed records on fourteenth
amendment grounds claiming serious psychological trauma and pain and suffering),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979) ; see also In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978);
Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646
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ficulty establishing a personal identity.3 I Describing their
feelings of isolation, they use terms like "emptiness," "false,"
"not being a whole or real person. ' 32 Problems with identity
formation are particularly acute during adolescence33 and at
crisis points in adulthood. 4 Thus, adoptees claim that
sealed records deny them the means to develop a sense of
self which is essential to a healthy and satisfying life.
35
A diminished sense of self is also related to "genealogical
bewilderment. ' 36 Adoptees do not share the pleasure that
most family members feel who know about their ancestors.37
(1977); Linda F.M. v. Department of Health, 52 N.Y.2d 236, 238, 418 N.E.2d 1302,
1304 (adult adoptee alleged that inability to know identity caused psychological
problems which ended her marriage and hampered her creative talents), cert. dis-
missedsub nom., Mason v. Abrams, 444 U.S. 806 (1981).
31. See A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 3, at 97-98, in which
the authors cite unique aspects of the adoptee's backround which affect his or her
personality development. They include poor prenatal care and delivery complica-
tions, prenatal maternal stress and early maternal deprivation. See generall F.
FISHER, THE SEARCH FOR ANNA FISHER (1973); J. TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORI-
GINS: THE EXPERIENCE OF ADOPTED PEOPLE 2 (1973).
32. J. TRISELIOTIS, supra note 31, at 82.
33. A. SOROsKy, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 3, at 105-19. Describing
these conflicts as "identity locuna," the authors describe the adolescent adoptee's
confusion:
In part, [an adolescent's] sense of identity is established through identifica-
tion with the parents, especially the one of the same sex. In the case of the
adopted adolescent the process is complicated because he/she has the knowl-
edge that an essential part of himself/herself has been cut off and remains on
the other side of the adoption barrier.
Id. at 110 (footnotes omitted).
34. Note, supra note 23, at 1202.
35. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, _ 372
A.2d 646, 655 (1977).
36. In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, _., 586 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1978).
37. Id. See also, In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766-67 (Mo. 1978) (Seiler, J.,
concurring), in which Judge Seiler states:
I note briefly the current fascination with the profound achievement of au-
thor Alex Haley in his recorded search for geneological roots. These sensa-
tions of the consciousness of personal history are ample testimonials to the
unique anxiety of Americans in discovering our origins; for we are, with rare
exception, a nation of uprooted immigrants whose family crests are little more
than the remnants of graffiti on the steerage deck walls of a generation of ves-
sels.
All of us need to know our past, not only for a sense of lineage and heri-
tage, but for a fundamental and crucial sense of our very selves: our identity is
incomplete and our sense of self retarded without a real personal historical
connection.
(footnote omitted.)
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Beyond being denied the enjoyment of family history, some
adoptees fear incestuous marriages.38 Others are preoccu-
pied with fantasies about their "other" parents.39 They often
have unanswered questions about why they were separated
from birth parents and unrealistic ideas about who those
parents are.
Medical crises often precipitate the need for information
about biological relatives. 4° Ranging from allergies to
searches for transplant donors, medical needs can leave
adoptees without sufficient information to get proper treat-
ment. Short of a crisis, impending marriage and childbear-
ing lead to concerns about genetic disease and hereditary
traits. 4' Other reasons for open records advanced by
adoptees include inheritance rights, 42 religion,43 and simply
a longing to meet their birth parents.44
Adopted persons also argue that sealed records are at
odds with the purpose of adoption which is to promote the
best interests of the adoptee .4  Although sealed records may
benefit an adopted child by promoting stability in the adop-
tive family, the focus changes when the child reaches matur-
ity. At that point, adoptees claim a right to privacy, which
they argue is a fundamental right to know one's identity,
38. See, e.g., State v. Sharon H., 429 A.2d 1321 (Del. 1981) (half-brother and
sister, both adoptees, who married were charged with violation of criminal statutes in
Delaware).
39. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, _, 372
A.2d 646, 655 (1977).
40. See, e.g.,In re George, 625 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (adult adoptee
petitioned court for identifying information about biological relatives in order to find
a donor for a bone marrow transplant).
41. See, e.g., Chattman v. Bennett, 57 A.D.2d 618, , 393 N.Y.S.2d 768, 768-69
(1977) (court directed medical records to be released to married adoptee thinking of
starting her own family; she was concerned with the possibility of genetic or heredi-
tary factors which might cause problems for her children).
42. See, e.g., Spillman v. Parker, 332 So. 2d 573, 576 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (court
held that denying adoptee access to confidential records would have the effect of vio-
lating his or her right to inherit from biological parents, a right provided for in Louisi-
ana law).
43. See, e.g., In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1978) (a member of the Mormon
Church petitioned for access to sealed birth records on the grounds that his religion
required tracing his ancestry).
44. See generally F. FISHER, supra note 31.
45. Comment, Sealed Records in Adoptions, supra note 23, at 217 n.38.
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equal to the privacy right of the birth parent.46 Therefore,
they deny that confidentiality remains in the best interests of
an adult adoptee.47
B. Privacy of the Birth Parents
In the past the majority of birth parents who relin-
quished their children for adoption did so because they were
born out of wedlock.48  The parents placed the child for
adoption because they determined that it was in the best in-
terests of themselves and the child. Sealing their names re-
flected a legislative judgment that anonymity was necessary
to encourage the use of adoption.49 Beyond assurances of
confidentiality provided by statute °50 adoption agencies have
also promised secrecy to birth parents.5 Secrecy provided
the parent a clear path away from events surrounding the
46. In re Roger B., 84 111. 2d 323, _ 418 N.E.2d 751, 753, cert. dismissed sub
nom. Barth v. Finley, 454 U.S. 806 (1981); In re Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 232 S.E.2d
479 (1977).
47. Levin, supra note 23, at 507; Comment, Sealed Records in Adoptions, supra
note 23, at 217; Comment, The Adult Adoptee'r Constitutional Right, supra note 23, at
1211.
48. A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 3, at 47. The authors state:
The National Center for Social Services estimated that in 1971, 60 per cent
of all children adopted in the United States, about 101,000, were born out of
wedlock. This statistic is misleading because it implies, without explanation,
that 40 per cent of the children placed for adoption are legitimate. It is impor-
tant to differentiate between the traditional nonrelative adoptive placement
and the relative or step-parent adoption. Most of the 60 per cent represents
nonrelative adoptions, while most of the 40 per cent represents relative or step-
parent adoptions. More significant is the fact that despite the availability of
legal abortions and the efforts to disseminate contraception information, there
is still a slight increase in the number of illegitimate births among teen-agers in
the United States and no evidence of any decline among members of any age
group.
Id. (footnote omitted).
49. Comment, A Step Toward Resolving, supra note 23, at 352.
50. For a list of statutes providing confidentiality, see supra note 4.
51. Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310, 1315 (La. 1979); Mills v. Atlantic City
Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 311, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (1977). But see
A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 3, at 53, in which the authors' study
revealed that 82% of the birth parents contacted said they would be interested in a
reunion with their child when the child reached adulthood. Some commentators con-
tend that these studies diminish the argument that promises of confidentiality must be
strictly observed. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 23, at 502; Comment, Sealed Records in
Adoptions, supra note 23, at 226.
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child's birth in order to build a new life. Moreover, the
interests of the birth parents continue beyond the adoptee's
childhood years.5 3 One court has stated, "[t]here must be
finality for the natural parents and a new beginning; if there
is a right of privacy not to be lightly infringed, it would seem
to be theirs. 54 The right of privacy assures that the parent-
child relationship will be completely severed."
Attempts by adoptees or adoption agencies to break this
seal of privacy could have traumatic consequences. 6 Indis-
criminate disclosure would reopen a painful episode in the
birth parents' lives. Moreover, birth parents often establish
a new family unit with the expectation of confidentiality
concerning the adoption.5 8 Disclosure could cause a com-
plete disruption of the parents' current private lives.59
C. Stability of the Adoptive Family
Adoption proceedings make the adoptive parents the
child's legal parents conferring on them all the rights and
duties of parenthood they would have had if the child were
52. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978).
53. In re Roger B., 84 111. 2d 323, _ 418 N.E.2d 751, 754 (citing ALMA Soc'y v.
Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1236 (2d Cir. 1979)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 806 (1981); Mills v.
Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 303, 316, 372 A.2d 646, 663
(1977).
54. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1978).
55. Id.
56. Id. The court gave two hypotheticals to illustrate its point:
Assume an illegitimate birth followed by adoption and thereafter the natu-
ral mother marries and has children by that marriage. Should the adopted
child be permitted, through state action, to present himself at the home of her
new family and lay bare the tragic secrets of the past? We think not. Or con-
sider the situation in which a married woman, whose husband is absent, (per-
haps overseas in the Armed Services) and through an adulterous relationship
bears a child whom she promptly places for adoption. Must not the law permit
this sorry person privacy without fear of the natural child's appearance at her
family home with its potentially disastrous effect?
Id.
57. Id.
58. However, some commentators have argued that traditional tort remedies offer
sufficient protection to birth parents for invasion of their privacy. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 23, at 1217. Such a remedy does not prevent the harm, but would compen-
sate the birth parents. Id. at 1217 n.121.
59. One commentator suggests that birth parents may suffer three possible harms:
emotional distress, disruption of interpersonal relationships, and public exposure and
embarrassment. Note, supra note 23, at 1215.
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their biological offspring.60 Sealed records laws were
promulgated to shield this relationship.6' Many adoptive
parents see themselves as the child's only "real" parents.62
They fear that liberalizing records laws may divert the
child's affection and that they will lose the child to the birth
parents.63 Some of them experience anxiety and rejection
when the child begins to explore the past.64 They are also
concerned that the child will be hurt by the facts revealed.
Sealed records also enhance family stability. The family
serves society by providing consistency and stability during a
child's formative years.6 Unnecessary intrusion brought
about by changes in present policies may hamper this famil-
ial function.67 Confidential records, on the other hand, are
60. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 48.92 (1981-82), which provides in relevant part:
Effect of adoption. (1) After the order of adoption is entered the relation
of parent and child and all rights, duties and other legal consequences of the
natural relation of child and parent thereafter exists between the adopted per-
son and the adoptive parents.
(2) After the order of adoption is entered the relationship of parent and
child between the adopted person and his birth parents, unless the birth parent
is the spouse of the adoptive parent, shall be completely altered and all the
rights, duties and other legal consequences of the relationship shall cease to
exist.
61. See Comment, Sealed Records in Adoptions, supra note 23, at 212-13.
62. See id. at 222-23, in which the author states:
Some adoptive parents prefer to ignore the fact that the child was not born to
them and refuse to recognize that adopting a child is different from giving
birth to a child. They look upon themselves as the child's "only parents." As
far as they are concerned, the relationship between the natural parents and the
child, a relationship viewed as a mere circumstance of biology, ceases to exist
after the adoption.
Id. (footnote omitted).
63. A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 3, at 73-86. The authors
assert that there is no evidence supporting these fears. Id. at 73.
64. See id. at 85. See also Levin, supra note 23, at 504.
65. A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 3, at 85.
66. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEsT INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 13 (1973).
67. See, e.g.,In re Roger B., 84 Ill. 2d 323,_ 418 N.E.2d 751,754, cert. dismissed
sub nom., Barth v. Finley, 454 U.S. 806 (1981). Adoptees, however, have argued that
the guarding of the familial bond in the adoptive family is no longer necessary once
the adoptee has reached adulthood. Levin, supra note 23, at 507. This position is
rejected by the courts. See, for example, ALMA Soe'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1231
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979), in which the court stated that "It]he
adoptee's attainment of majority is a definite event in the adoptee's life; but it occurs
independent of either the legally terminated natural family relationship or the legally
assumed adoptive one and does not affect termination or continuation of those rela-
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thought to promote emotional attachments in the adoptive
family.
D. State's Interest in Adoption
Through its police andparenspatriae power,68 the state
protects the health and welfare of children who are not able
to live with their birth parents.69 Adoption serves this pur-
pose by providing a substitute family.70 Sealed records fur-
ther state interests by creating an atmosphere for honesty in
the preadoption investigation so that all relevant facts will
be revealed which will enable the state to make the best
placement for the child. 1 Confidentiality also helps the
adoptive family establish itself as a social unit thereby meet-
ing the child's needs.72 Finally, closed records are thought to
erase the stigma of illegitimacy and thus protect the child
from societal disapproval.73
The state also has an interest in protecting the birth par-
ents' privacy.74 This protection promotes adoption as a via-
ble system. Abandonment of this legally sanctioned
process for placement may lead to more complex social
problems.76 Furthermore, state purposes are served by hon-
tionships." See also In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Mo. 1978), in which the court
maintained that adoptive parents, particularly in their old age, deserve the child's
loyalty.
68. See Developments in the Law--The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1198-1202 (1980).
69. See Comment, supra note 7, at 718.
70. Note, supra note 23, at 1199.
71. Id. at 1199-1200. See also Comment, Breaking the Seal, supra note 23, at 337.
72. Note, supra note 23, at 1199-1200.
73. Comment, supra note 14, at 473; Note, supra note 14, at 472.
74. Note, supra note 14, at 471.
75. Comment,, AStep Toward Resolving, supra note 23, at 352.
76. Klibanoff, Genealogical Information in Adoption: The Adoptee's Quest and the
Law, I1 FAM. L.Q. 185 (1977). The author states:
The primary interest of the public is to preserve the integrity of the adop-
tive process. That is, the continued existence of adoption as a humane solution
to the serious social problem of children who are or may become unwanted,
abused or neglected. In order to maintain it, the public has an interest in as-
suring that changes in law, policy or practice will not be made which nega-
tively affect the supply of capable adoptive parents or the willingness of
biological parents to make decisions which are best for them and their chil-
dren. We should not increase the risk of neglect to any child, nor should we
force parents to resort to the black market in order to surrender children they
can't care for.
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oring the promises of anonymity given to birth parents at the
time of the adoption.77
III. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO GAIN ACCESS
Utilizing the courts, adoptees have made numerous at-
tempts to circumvent confidential records laws.78 They have
argued that state statutes violate their first amendment right
to receive information,79 their fourteenth and ninth amend-
ments right to privacy, ° their fourteenth amendment right to
equal protection of the laws,8 ' their fourteenth amendment
right to property and their thirteenth amendment protection
against the badges of slavery.82  State and federal courts
have uniformly upheld sealed records statutes against these
constitutional challenges. 83 Efforts to expand statutory defi-
nitions of good cause have been an alternate line of attack.84
In most cases, broadening the judicial definition of good
cause to include an adoptee's psychological need to know his
or her identity would be sufficient to enable an adoptee to
Id. at 196-97.
77. Note, supra note 14, at 472-73.
78. See, e.g., ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.) (court upheld con-
stitutionality of New York's sealed records statute against claim that they violated
adoptee's first, thirteenth and fourteenth amendment rights), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979)); In re Linda F.M., 95 Misc. 2d 581, 409 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1978) (court up-
held statute over adult adoptee's challenge on fourteenth amendment privacy and
equal protection grounds), affdsub nom, Linda F.M. v. Dep't of Health, 52 N.Y.2d
236, 418 N.E.2d 1302, cert. dismissed sub nom., Mason v. Abrams, 454 U.S. 806
(1981); In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978) (adult adoptee sought identity of
birth parents arguing that denial of access violated first and fourteenth amendments).
79. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Mo. 1978).
80. In re Roger B., 84 Ill. 2d 323, _ 418 N.E.2d 751, 753, cert. dismissed sub
nom., Barth v. Finley, 454 U.S. 806 (1981). For a discussion of ninth amendment
arguments, see Comment, Adoptee's Right to Identity -A Ninth Amendment Approach
to the Sealed Birth Certocate Statute, 27 S.D.L. REv. 122 (1982), in which the author
argues that an adoptee's right to an identity is a fundamental right not enumerated in
the first eight amendments, but protected by the ninth amendment. Id. at 130-31.
81. ALMA Soe'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1230 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979).
82. Id.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 87-159.
84. See Massey v. Parker, 362 So. 2d 1195 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (adoptee's right to
inherit from blood relatives was sufficient cause for unsealing records), rev"d, 369 So.
2d 1310 (La. 1979); In re Anonymous, 92 Misc. 2d 224, 399 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Sup. Ct.
1977) (mental illness of adoptee good cause to open records); In re Spinks, 32 N.C.
App. 422, 232 S.E.2d 479 (1977) (eighteen year old adoptee alleged that a psychologi-
cal need to know was sufficient cause to open records).
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obtain the desired information. 5  However, there has been
no consistent statement from the courts on the definition of
good cause. 6
A. Constitutional Challenges
1. The Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court has recognized a right to privacy in
the penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth
amendments of the Constitution.87 Moreover, the Court has*
repeatedly held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment prevents state intrusion into an individual's life
on matters relating to marriage, 8 procreation,8 9 contracep-
tion,90 family relationships9' and childrearing.92 Although
the Court's privacy decisions are not easily classifiable,93 the
85. See supra notes 27-47 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 160-94 and accompanying text.
87. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
88. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
89. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
90. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
91. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
92. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
93. See Comment, supra note 7, at 728 n.49, in which the author comments on the
petitioner's claim to privacy in ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979):
A court's finding that a plaintiff has presented a valid privacy claim must,
of course, conform to the Supreme Court's decisions on privacy. However, the
Supreme Court's decisions are not easily classifiable; nor do they provide
lower courts with clear guidance for the resolution of claims that an activity or
interest is or should be protected. See McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355,
1379 (D.N.J. 1978).
Courts and scholars have tried to organize the Supreme Court's decisions
into a cohesive doctrine of privacy. The Supreme Court itself has divided its
decisions into two categories: cases involving "the individual interest in avoid-
ing disclosure of personal matters, and . . . [those involving] the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). Scholars have developed other categories.
See, e.g., Gerety, Redefming Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233 (1977)
(classifying the decisions under the definitional words automony, indentity and
intimacy); Kurland, The Private I, U. OF CHI. MAGAZINE, 7, 8 (Autumn 1976)
(establishing three facets of privacy: the right to be free from government in-
trusion and surveillance; the right not to have one's private affairs made public
by the government; and the right "to be free in action, thought, experience,
and belief from government compulsion"); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy:
Repose, Sanctuary, andIntimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447 (1976) (cate-
gorizes the Supreme Court's privacy decisions as involving repose (freedom
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criterion expounded has been that only those personal rights
deemed fundamental9 4 or "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" 95 are constitutionally protected. Adoptees have at-
tempted to establish that they have a fundamental right to
their birth records.96 If a fundamental right were involved,
courts would apply strict scrutiny to records statutes.97 The
strict scrutiny test would require states to show a compelling
interest in order to withstand adoptees' constitutional
challenges.98
In 1979 the constitutional arguments surrounding sealed
records cases were considered for the first time by a federal
appellate court in ALMA Society, Inc. v. Mellon." ALMA
Society members claimed, among other things, that learning
the identity of their parents was a fundamental privacy right
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. t°° Characterizing this as a right to personhood,10 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarized the
adoptees' privacy claim as follows: "An adoptee is someone
upon whom the state has, by sealing his records, imposed
life-long familial amnesia.., injuring the adoptee in regard
to his personal identity when he was too young to consent to,
or even know, what was happening."' 0 2
The court responded to the adoptees' challenge by noting
that their right to privacy, if a legitimate constitutional right,
must be examined in the context of the right to family pri-
from unwanted stimuli), sanctuary (protection from intrusive observation),
and privacy (intimate decision-making)).
94. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
95. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
96. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 84 Ill. 2d 323, _ 418 N.E.2d 751, 753-54, cert.
dismissedsub nort., Barth v. Finley, 454 U.S. 806 (1981).
97. See Comment, Breaking the Seal, supra note 23, at 319 n.16 ("Although strict
scrutiny arose in the equal protection context, it has been recognized as applicable
where a fundamental right is involved." (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,383
(1978))).
98. Comment, Breaking the Seal, supra note 23, at 319.
99. 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979). The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed plaintiffs claim on the basis of the abstention
doctrine in Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1977).
100. 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
101. Id. at 1231. The court noted that adoptees relied on Supreme Court cases
involving familial relationships, right to family privacy and freedom to marry and
reproduce.
102. Id.
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vacy in general. 10 3 It emphasized two recent Supreme Court
cases dealing with fourteenth amendment rights in family re-
lationships. In Quilloin v. Wolcoll'°4 a biological father
sought to block the adoption of his illegitimate child by the
mother's husband. 05 The ALMA court was particularly im-
pressed by language in Quilloin which stood for the principle
that full recognition and protection must be granted to a
family unit already in existence."°6 Based on this language,
the ALMA court concluded that adoptive parents have a
constitutionally recognized privacy interest. 0 7 The court
also looked to Zablocki v. Redhail.'0 That case involved a
challenge to a statute which required parents paying child
support to obtain permission of the court before marrying.
The ALMA court found Zablocki instructive because it rec-
ognized that privacy decisions must weigh "the nature of the
relationship and [recognize] that choices made by those
other than the adopted child are involved."109
Relying on these decisions, the ALMA court held that
the New York statute which required good cause to open
adoption files was not unconstitutional. '10 It concluded that
the legislature had taken into account the varying interests
and relationships involved and had struck a permissible bal-
ance. II The court stated that in striking a balance, the legis-
lation does not "unconstitutionally infringe upon or
arbitrarily remove appellant's rights of identity, privacy, or
personhood.""12
Adoptees' privacy challenges have also been rejected by
state courts. The cases reflect, however, varying approaches
103. Id. ("We note, of course, that we are dealing with the 'family' in general
and with two families in particular - first, the natural parent(s). . . and second, the
adopting family which has presumably nurtured the child to the age of adulthood.").
104. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
105. Id. at 247.
106. ALMA Soc)', 601 F.2d at 1232.
107. Id.
108. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
109. ALMA Socy, 601 F.2d at 1233.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. The ALMA court's reasoning was recently echoed in another federal
court case, Schechter v. Boren, 535 F. Supp. I (W.D. Okla. 1980), in which the court,
in a memorandum opinion, upheld an Oklahoma confidential adoption records
statute.
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to adoptees' arguments. 1 3 Mills v. Atlantic City Department
of Vital Statistics14 is the leading state case. In Mills the
court recognized that background and health information
was essential to a person's identity and self-image,1 5 but
held that personal identity was not an interest so intimately
personal so as to be included within the zone of privacy pro-
tected by the Constitution." 6 The court properly concluded
that, because no fundamental interest was involved, the New
Jersey sealed records statute should be upheld if it was rea-
sonable and rationally related to a permissible state objec-
tive.1 7 Concluding that the statute properly weighed the
competing interests of adoptees, birth parents and adoptive
parents, the court held that the test was met." 8
A Missouri law was attacked by an adult adoptee who
had obtained nonidentifying information from her file but
wished to inspect the complete record in In Re Maples." 9
The state supreme court thought, however, that her reliance
on the Supreme Court's "family relationship" privacy cases
was misplaced. 20 The court gave great deference to the
state's interest in protecting the birth parents' privacy and
stressed the assurances given to them that their relationship
to the child would be severed.' 2' Of equal concern was pro-
tecting the institution of adoption through confidential
records.12 2 The court therefore rejected Maples' privacy
claims noting that she had prospered socially, intellectually
and financially in her adoptive family. 2 3
Adoptees' right to privacy arguments received similar
treatment in a recent Illinois case. In In Re Roger B. 124 the
Illinois Supreme Court concurred with other state and fed-
113. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 84 Ill. 2d 323, 418 N.E.2d 751, cert. dismissed sub
nom., Barth v. Finley, 454 U.S. 806 (1981).
114. 148 N. J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (1977).
115. Id. at _, 372 A.2d at 655.
116. Id. at __ 372 A.2d at 650.
117. Id. at , 372 A.2d at 651.
118. Id. at _ 372 A.2d at 652.
119. 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978).
120. Id. at 763.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 764.
124. 84 111. 2d 323, 418 N.E.2d 751, cert. dismissed sub nort, Barth v. Finley, 454
U.S. 806 (1981).
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eral courts which have held that an adoptee does not have a
fundamental right to examine his or her adoption records.125
Even though it recognized the importance of Roger's interest
in his identity, 26 the court used the rational basis test be-
cause the interest was not fundamental.1 27 The court deter-
mined that the Illinois sealed records statute represented a
reasonable legislative judgment that confidentiality pro-
motes the integrity of the adoption process. 128 Although the
court weighed the countervailing interest of the adult
adoptee, it balanced the adoptee's interest against the "rela-
tionship and choices made by all parties concerned." 1 29
2. Equal Protection
Most of the cases discussed in regard to privacy chal-
lenges also include claims that sealed records statutes deny
adoptees equal protection of the laws.' 30  The equal protec-
tion argument was cogently addressed in the ALMA deci-
sion.' 3' The adult adoptees claimed that adopted status was
a suspect classification and therefore the state must show a
compelling interest to support the validity of sealed records
laws. 32 The adoptees inALMA argued that they were enti-
125. Id. at _ 418 N.E.2d at 753.
126. Id. at - 418 N.E.2d at 755-56.
127. Id. at _ 418 N.E.2d at 754.
128. Id
129. Id. at 418 N.E.2d at 756.
130. See supra notes 99-129 and accompanying text. See generally Comment,
Adoptee's Equal Protection Rights, supra note 23.
131. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995
(1979).
132. One commentator summarized the equal protection analysis as follows:
As courts and commentators have often pointed out, equal protection does
not mean that "things different in fact [must] be treated in law as though they
were the same." If a state's unequal treatment of a group is "reasonable," it
generally will past muster under the equal protection clause. However, where
unequal treatment threatens a particularly important or "fundamental" right,
or injures a particularly vulnerable, or "suspect," class, the Supreme Court has
held that the treatment is subject to the Court's strict scrutiny. To withstand
such scrutiny, the inequality must be much more than reasonable-it must be
necessary to the accomplishment of a compelling state objective.
The suspect classifications which trigger strict scrutiny are limited to those
based on race, alienage, and national origin. However, the Supreme Court has
also created an unofficial "middle tier" of protection scrutiny which is applica-
ble to "quasi-suspect" classifications such as those based on sex or illegitimacy.
To be held constitutional, quasi-suspect classifications "must serve important
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tled to at least the same level of judicial scrutiny afforded
illegitimates, a class designated as sensitive or as quasi-sus-
pect. 133 Courts have held that legislation dealing with quasi-
suspect classifications must be subject to an intermediate
level of judicial scrutiny. 134 In the alternative, the adoptees
urged the application of strict scrutiny on the theory that any
group impressed with the incidents of slavery is also a sus-
pect class under the equal protection clause. 35
The court dismissed the latter argument with little dis-
cussion indicating that the Supreme Court has been very re-
luctant to expand the list of traits subject to strict scrutiny
under the thirteenth amendment. 3 6 Addressing the first
contention, the court found no logic in comparing adult
adoptees who must show cause to view records with illegiti-
mate persons who have unrestricted access to birth
records.137 It described the problem as follows:
When a court decides that a classification is suspect or
quasi-suspect, it has concluded that the State has employed
a questionable trait to distinguish those whom the law
should burden from those whom the law should not. Here,
however, the distinguishing trait between adult adoptees
and nonadopted illegitimates, the allegedly similarly situ-
ated classes, is not illegitimacy - indeed, both of these
classes are largely comprised of illegitimates, according to
appellants. The trait, rather, is adopted status.' 38
The court concluded that the adoptees presented no con-
vincing arguments that they were treated so differently as to
warrant even quasi-suspect classification. Thus, the sealed
records laws withstood the constitutional challenge. 139 In
dicta, the court stated further that even if adopted status was
a quasi-suspect class, the statutes would survive intermediate
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." An analysis of the Court's criteria for suspect and quasi-
suspect classes suggests that adoptees may qualify as a quasi-suspect class.
Comment, Adoptee's Equal Protection Rights, supra note 23, at 1332-33 (footnotes
omitted).
133. ALMA Soc),, 601 F.2d at 1233.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1233-34.
136. Id. at 1234.
137. Id.
138. Id. (emphasis in original).
139. Id.
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scrutiny because they are substantially related to an impor-
tant state interest. 40
3. Right to Receive Information
Constitutional challenges have also arisen on first
amendment grounds. 4 1 The Missouri Supreme Court in In
re Maples 14 2 addressed the usual first amendment argument.
Maples had contended that denying her access to sealed
records violated her right to receive information as deline-
ated in three United States Supreme Court cases. 43 Under
the first amendment, the Court has held that a city may not
restrict the dissemination of ideas by limiting the distribu-
tion of handbills, 44 that a state may not prohibit the sale of
obscene films to adults 45 and that a state may not forbid the
use of contraceptives by married persons. 46 The rationale
behind these decisions was the constitutional prohibition
against restricting the free flow of ideas from one person to
another. 47 The Maples court did not find the principle ap-
plicable to adoption records. 48
Instead, the court stated, "the information sought here is
the product of the judicial process, gathered under the
scheme of the adoption laws. Control of these records to
promote this highly desirable system stands in contrast to the
prevention of the transfer of handbills, films or medical ad-
vice from one person to another. . . .,149 The court held
that the state, by protecting adoption records, exercised a
valid state interest which did not infringe on Maples' first
amendment rights. 5 0
4. Other Constitutional Arguments
Several adoptees have contended that closed records stat-
140. Id.
141. See generally Comment, Breaking the Seal, supra note 23, at 329-32.
142. 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978).
143. Id. at 762. See infra notes 144-46 for these cases.
144. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943).
145. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
146. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
147. Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 762.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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utes violate the thirteenth amendment.' 5 InALMA Society,
Inc. v. Mellon, 152 adoptees proposed that New York's sealed
records statute imposed on them an incident of slavery
which had been abolished by the thirteenth amendment. 53
The ALMA court, acknowledging the novelty of the argu-
ment,154 rejected the claim because it did not conform to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the thirteenth amend-
ment. It pointed out that the Court has never held that the
amendment, unaided by legislation, addresses the badges
and incidents of slavery in addition to the actual condition
of slavery.155
Another unique argument was presented in In re Ro-
mano. 156 There an incarcerated man petitioned for release
of his adoption records to aid in his rehabilitation. 157 One
claim he made was that the denial of access violated his
eighth amendment right against cruel and unusual punish-
ment. 58 The court, however, summarily dismissed the con-
stitutional challenges without addressing their merits.'5 9
B. Expanding Good Cause
Because state and federal courts have repeatedly upheld
sealed records statutes, 60 adoptees have sought a broadened
definition of good cause.' 6 1 Inconsistencies have resulted
from the variety of approaches taken by the courts. Many
courts have been willing to open records for medical rea-
151. See, e.g., ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1236-37 (2d Cir.), cer.
denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
152. 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
153. Id. at 1237.
154. Id. at 1236.
155. Id. at 1237.
156. 109 Misc. 2d 99, 438 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1981).
157. Id. at __ 438 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
158. Id. at - 438 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
159. Id. at -, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 78-159.
161. Most of the discussion regarding good cause assumes that the adoptee is
trying to obtain access. The courts have been asked to open records when biological
siblings petitioned, In Re Lay, 382 So. 2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (court found
good cause could be shown if siblings separated by adoption sought unsealing of
records), and when a birth mother petitionned, In Re Christine, 397 A.2d 511 (R.I.
1979) (mother's desire to see child did not constitute good cause). See generally An-
not. 83 A.L.R.3d 800, 806-07 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
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sons 162 or to protect inheritance rights. 163 Yet age, 164 psycho-
logical needs,165 the desire to learn one's ancestry 166 and
mere curiosity167 have not been found sufficient. However,
courts have shown a tendency to relax restrictions when in-
formation can be released without identifying the birth par-
ents 168 or when consent is obtained from them by an
intermediary. 169
Courts have clearly held that an adoptee's right to inherit
from blood relatives constitutes good cause,170 but they have
retreated from full disclosure of all the information in the
adoption record. 17' In Spillman v. Parker17 2  an adult
adoptee requested permission to view his file to determine
whether he had any inheritance rights.173  The Louisiana
Court of Appeals found this to be a valid reason and allowed
Spillman to inspect his records. 174 Subsequently, however,
the same court opted for a more tempered solution, and, in
162. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978) (adult adoptee received non-
identifying information on health and physical condition of birth parents without re-
ceiving their identities). For a discussion of Maples, see Comment, In Re The
Application of Annetta Louise Maples: The Adoptee's Right to Know, 23 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 731 (1979).
163. Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1979) (court opened records to extent
that it examined them to determine whether adoptee had inheritance rights).
164. In re Roger B., 84 IM. 2d 323, 418 N.E.2d 751 (adulthood alone not good
cause), cert. dismissed sub nom., Barth v. Finley, 454 U.S. 806 (1981).
165. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1978) (plaintiff showed no compel-
ling psychological need).
166. Linda F.M. v. Department of Health, 52 N.Y.2d 236, 418 N.E.2d 1302 (de-
sire to learn ancestry not good cause), cert. dismissedsub nom., Mason v. Abrams, 454
U.S. 806 (1981).
167. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, _, 372
A.2d 646, 655 (1977) ("An adoptee who is moved to a court proceeding such as the
one here is impelled by a need to know which is far deeper than 'mere curiosity.' ").
168. In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978).
169. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, __ 372
A.2d 646, 656 (1977) (suggests use of agency intermediary to investigate and make
recommendation to court).
170. Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1979). For a discussion of Louisi-
ana's changing statutes and case law regarding open records, see Note, Confidentiality
of Adoption Records: Can the Real Needs of the Adoptee Be Satisfed?, 25 Loy. L.
REv. 787 (1979).
171. Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310, 1315 (La. 1979).
172. 332 So. 2d 573 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
173. Id. at 574.
174. Id. at 576.
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Massey v. Parker, 17 5 a similar request was turned down. The
court held that although inheritance rights were compelling
reasons, the adoptee need not inspect the records because the
court could do so and determine whether any inheritance
rights existed. 76
Evaluating the adoptee's psychological and medical
needs has been a more difficult task for courts. Although
one federal circuit court suggested that psychological needs
or medical emergencies would constitute good cause, 177 these
needs have been balanced against the interests of both the
birth parents and the adoptive parents. 7 8 For example, de-
spite compelling medical needs, the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals in In re George179 fashioned a remedy designed to
protect the interests of all parties.18 0  The petitioner was a
thirty-three year old adoptee suffering from chronic myelo-
cytic leukemia who was seeking a bone marrow donor. Af-
ter contacting the birth mother who refused to release her
identity or the name of the father, the trial court denied the
adoptee access to his record.1 8 1 The appellate court reviewed
the medical evidence and determined that there was suffi-
cient cause to remand the case for further proceedings. 182 It
directed the trial court to contact the father and to accept the
birth mother's offer to submit to medical testing without dis-
closing her identity. 83
In In re Hayden 18 4 a New York court concluded that an
adoptee's allegations that she was a possible "DES baby"'18 5
and was suffering psychological harm as a result did consti-
tute good cause.'8 6 On the other hand, good cause has not
been found when a psychological need is not accompanied
175. 369 So. 2d 1310 (La. 1979).
176. Id. at 1315.
177. ALMA Soc'y v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979).
178. Id. at 1231.
179. 625 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
180. Id. at 155.
181. Id. at 152.
182. Id. at 160.
183. Id.
184. 435 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1981).
185. Id. at 545.
186. Id.
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by other symptoms of emotional or mental illness. 187 For
example, the petitioner in Linda FM v. Department of
Health 188 claimed that her inability to discover the identity
of her birth parents impaired her psychologically, causing
her marriage to break up and stifling her artistic talents. 8 9
The court distilled the complaint to simply a desire to know
her ancestry and held that this was not good cause within the
statutory requirement. 190
Adulthood alone was rejected as sufficient cause in In Re
Roger B. 191 Roger portrayed himself as emotionally, physi-
cally and financially comfortable. 92 Since he demonstrated
no psychiatric or medical need, the Illinois Supreme Court
denied him access to identifying information about his birth
parents. 9
3
In summary, adoptees' arguments justifying disclosure
under good cause have met with mixed responses from
courts. Clearly courts are expressing a willingness to distin-
guish nonidentifying information and to allow access with a
lesser showing of cause. However, before revealing the iden-
tity of birth parents, courts proceed cautiously. They look
for compelling reasons or employ intermediaries to contact
birth parents to obtain their consent.
IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Commentators have suggested that legislative reform of-
fers the most profitable avenue for the changes urged by
adoptees. 94 Although sealed records statutes enacted in the
187. Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, _ 372
A.2d 646, 655 (1977).
188. 437 N.Y.S.2d 283, 418 N.E.2d 1302, cert. dismissed sub nom., Mason v.
Abrams, 454 U.S. 806 (1981).
189. Id. at 285, 418 N.E.2d at 1304.
190. Id.
191. 84 11. 2d 323, 418 N.E.2d 751, cert. dismissedsub nom., Barth v. Finley, 454
U.S. 806 (1981).
192. Id. at _, 418 N.E.2d at 752.
193. Id. at _, 418 N.E.2d at 757.
194. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 13, at 852. The author recommends:
The best possible solution is legislative reform. Comprehensive adoption
record confidentiality statutes should require that all relevant information be
included in the files and records of the adoption process and should address all
records of state and private adoption agencies . . . . Two provisions should
be made with respect to who may see adoption records, the first addressing the
['Vol. 67:110
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1930's and 1940's reflected then accepted views of the impor-
tance of secrecy, a different philosophy of adoption exists to-
day.195 Legislative action may be able to implement this
change in attitude most effectively. Statutory changes would
also eliminate the inconsistencies present in judicial inter-
pretations of constitutional issues196 and in judicially-defined
good cause. 9 7 Additionally, legislatures may be the more
appropriate forum for articulating criteria for unsealing the
records. 198
Three preliminary issues must be noted before surveying
recent legislative activity. First, few adoption records stat-
utes, open or closed, distinguish between information which
identifies the birth parent and information which does not. 199
Yet this distinction is important. Many adoptees could sat-
isfy their needs by receiving records and reports which do
not identify the birth parents. A close corollary to this issue
is the adequacy of background information in the file.200 An
adoptee's quest is not resolved if the records are incomplete.
Moreover, the birth parents' medical histories are not static.
Periodic updates would enhance the data's usefulness. A
third preliminary issue is the status of adoption agency
records.20 ' Although statutes are clear about confidential
court reports,20 2 the release of agency records is often un-
restricted.2 °3 Agency policies have controlled access and
most agencies have been liberal in releasing nonidentifying
time period before the order of adoption is final, and the second addressing the
time period after the order is final. Such provisions should allow attorneys of
the parties involved, as well as private and state agencies, to inspect the records
during the adoption process without securing a court order. Medical informa-
tion concerning the biological parents and the adopted child should be gath-
ered and placed in a separate report available to adoptive parents and to the
adoptee upon request, but the report on the biological parents should not con-
tain identifying inscriptions.
Id.
195. See A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 3, at 33-35.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 87-159.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 160-94.
198. Comment, Breaking the Seal, supra note 23, at 342.
199. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.150 (Supp. 1982); CAL. CIV. CODE § 227
(West 1982).
200. Comment, supra note 7, at 745.
201. Comment, A Step Toward Resolving, supra note 23, at 357.
202. See supra note 4.
203. Comment, A Step Toward Resolving, supra note 23, at 357-58.
1983]
MARQUE2TE L,4W REVIEW
information.2o4
Current legislative activity can be grouped into three cat-
egories. Most state legislatures still favor the status quo of
sealed records despite the regular introduction of proposals
for reform.205 Some states have made provisions for releas-
ing nonidentifying information.2° Others have gone further,
establishing procedures for updating information 2 7 and re-
vealing the identity of birth parents through court orders,0 8
review boards, 209 intermediaries210 or registries .211
South Carolina's statutory revisions are typical of new
laws which provide for release of nonidentifying informa-
tion on request.2 12 The statute provides that nonidentifying
information includes the health of the birth parent, the
health of the child, the child's general family history, and the
length of time the child has been in placement.2 3 A number
of states now provide that this information can be released to
the adult adoptee, the adoptive parent, and the child's
guardian if he or she is still a minor.214
Following the recommendations made by the New Jersey
Superior Court in Mills v. Atlantic City Department of Vital
Statistics,215 some states have set up intermediaries to facili-
tate the exchange of information between adoptees and their
birth parents.216 Connecticut and Minnesota, for example,
204. Comment, supra note 7, at 744.
205. See Comment, Adoptees' Equal Protection Rights, supra note 23, at 1317 &
n.17, in which the author lists recent legislative proposals. See also the proposed
Model State Adoption Act developed pursuant to Title II of the United States Code, 45
Fed. Reg. 10620 (1980).
206. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16 (West 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
15-16 (Supp. 1979).
207. See, e.g., MiNN STAT. ANN. § 259.4(2) (West 1982).
208. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16(2) (West 1981).
209. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-68d (West Supp. 1981). See also
Comment, The Arizona Adoption Records Statute, supra note 14, at 482, in which the
author recommends the establishment of a review board to investigate petitions for
unsealing records and make recommendations to the court.
210. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.49(2) (West Supp. 1983).
211. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2706-A (1980).
212. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780(d) (Supp. 1982).
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-68(e) (west Supp. 1981).
215. 148 N.J. Super. 302, _, 372 A.2d 646, 656 (1977).
216. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-68(i)-68(/) (West 1981); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 259.47 - .49 (West 1982).
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have established elaborate procedures to enable adult
adoptees to obtain identifying information.21 7 Connecticut
also provides for appeals to an adoption records review
board218 if a trial court denies access. Basically, these stat-
utes allow release of nonidentifying information on request
and release of identifying information with the consent of
the birth parents.21 9 Consent may be evidenced by an af-
fidavit filed by the birth parent either at the time of adoption
or after he or she has been contacted by an intermediary on
behalf of the state or the court.220
State registries are another type of statutory reform. A
registry simply provides that adult adoptees, adoptive par-
ents or birth parents list their names and addresses in a cen-
tral file to be released if a request is made. Maine currently
operates a state registry.221 The law allows a registrar to ob-
tain any information from those registering or those request-
ing information necessary to accurately identify the
parties.222 In addition, the state official may review both
public and confidential files to aid in verifying identities. 23
V. WISCONSIN'S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Wisconsin first closed its adoption records in 1929.224
The records were closed to all persons except parties and
certain state officials. In 1951 the records were closed even
to these persons and could be opened only "upon order of
the court for good cause shown. 225 Impetus for liberalizing
these statutes came from support groups in Wisconsin com-
posed of adoptees, adoptive parents, and birth parents.226
Their efforts coincide with a national movement for open
records.227 The movement's vitality comes from a belief that
adult adoptees are co-owners of their records and restricted
217. See id.
218. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-68(k) (West 1981).
219. See supra note 216.
220. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-680) (West 1981).
221. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2706-A (1980).
222. Id. § 2706-A(3).
223. Id. § 2706-A(4).
224. See Wis. STAT. § 322.06 (1929).
225. Wis. STAT. § 322.06 (1951).
226. See supra note 16.
227. See supra note 2.
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access denies them the right to an identity.228
A. Chapter 3.59
Chapter 359 of the Laws of 198 1,229 effective on May 7,
1982, enables adult adoptees to obtain medical and genetic
information upon request and, in many circumstances, to se-
cure other identifying information about their birth parents.
The Wisconsin Legislature has selected a balanced approach
to the sealed records controversy designed "to ensure sensi-
tive treatment of adoptees, birth parents, adoptive parents,
agencies, and all others who may be affected by the search
for and disclosure of genetic and medical information about
adoptees and birth parents and birth parent identity and
location. 23
0
1. Medical and Genetic Information
In all adoptions completed after May 7, 1982, the De-
partment of Health and Social Services (DHSS) is required
to maintain a central file of the medical and genetic informa-
tion contained in court reports submitted by agencies at the
time of the termination of parental rights.2 3' The compre-
hensive medical report must include:
1. The medical and genetic history of the birth parents
and any medical and genetic information furnished by the
birth parents about the child's grandparents, aunts, uncles,
brothers and sisters.
2. A report of any medical examination which either
birth parent had within one year before the date of the
petition.
3. A report describing the child's prenatal care and
medical condition at birth.
4. The medical and genetic history of the child and
any other relevant medical and genetic information.232
228. See supra text accompanying notes 87-129.
229. Act of May 6, 1982, ch. 359, 1981 Wis. Laws 1498 (codified at Wis. STAT.
§§20.435(2)j), 48.025(2), 48.422(9), 48.425(1)(am), 48.425(I)(1m), 48.425(l)(2),
48.427(6), 48.432, 48.433, 48.78, 48.93(1), 69.33(5), 69.33(6), 767.47(2m) (1981-82)).
230. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § HSS 53.01(1) (1983)(proposed rules of the Department
of Health and Social Services).
231. WIS. STAT. § 48.432(2)(a) (1981-82).
232. Id. § 48.425(1)(am).
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This information can be released upon request to the fol-
lowing persons: the adoptee who is eighteen years or older;
the adoptive parents; the guardian or legal custodian of the
adoptee who is under eighteen years of age; the offspring of
an adopted person if the offspring is eighteen years or older;
or any agency or social worker providing adoption serv-
ices.233 No proof of medical need is required, though, to ob-
tain information on adoptions completed before May 7,
1982.3 However, in these earlier adoptions the information
will generally not be available in DHSS files.
The statute provides that a requester may require DHSS
to conduct a search for the birth parents to secure genetic or
medical information not in the state's file.235 Each request,
however, must be accompanied by a written statement from
a physician certifying that the adoptee's medical condition
requires access or that the adoptee has or may have acquired
a genetically transferable disease. 36 The DHSS search
utilizes adoption agency records, vital records, telephone di-
rectories, motor vehicle records, marriage license files, Social
Security files and similar public and private records to locate
a birth parent.237 If located, the parent will be notified of the
request for nonidentifying medical and genetic informa-
tion.2 38 If the birth parent refuses to supply the requested
information, the requester is notified and may petition the
court for an order requiring disclosure. 39
2. Identifying Information
An adopted person over the age of twenty-one240 may re-
quest DHSS to release his or her original birth certificate
and other information including the identity and location of
233. Id. § 48.432(3)(a).
234. Id. § 48.432(4)(a).
235. Id. § 48.432(4)(b).
236. Id. § 48.432(4)(a).
237. Telephone interview with DHSS staff of the Adoption Information Search
Program (Mar. 10, 1983).
238. Wis. STAT. § 48.432(6)(e) (1981-82).
239. Id. § 48.432(6)(g).
240. In the drafting stage, discussions ensued regarding the appropriate age indi-
cating a level of maturity to cope with identifying information regarding birth par-
ents. The Committee selected 21 years for identifying information and 18 for
nonidentifying information. Interview with DHSS staff, supra note 237.
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the birth parent.24' There are several conditions under
which DHSS may release all available information. First,
the information will be released if both birth parents have
filed an affidavit with DHSS consenting to the disclosure of
identifying information.242 Second, if only one parent was
known at the time of the adoption and that parent filed an
affidavit of consent, the information is made available.243
Third, the requester will be allowed access if a birth parent
files an affidavit pursuant to a successful DHSS search.244
Finally, DHSS will provide the information if the requester
obtains a court order.245
If the birth parent is located as a result of the search,
DHSS will make at least one verbal contact with the parent
to notify him or her of the provisions of the law and the
nature of the request.246 The verbal contact will be followed
by a written notice including an affidavit form. 247  If the
signed affidavit is returned, DHSS will release the informa-
tion.248 If not, the requester must petition the court.249 In
order to respect the birth parent's privacy, DHSS may not
recontact him or her for at least twelve months.
B. Emerging Problems
Several questions about the legislation have already sur-
faced.2 5  First, the law does not clearly define nonidentify-
241. Wis. STAT. § 48.433(3) (1981-82).
242. Id. § 48.433(5)(a).
243. Id. § 48.433(5)(b).
244. Id. § 48.433(7)(c).
245. Id. § 48.433(9).
246. Id. § 48.433(7)(a).
247. Id. § 48.433(7)(b).
248. Id. § 48.433(7)(c).
249. Id. § 48.433(9).
250. Id. § 48.433(7)(f). The statute provides that following the second contact
after twelve months, "[flurther contacts with a birth parent under this subsection on
behalf of the same requester may be made only if 5 years have elapsed since the date
of the last contact." Id.
251. Some of these problems have been addressed in Wis. A.B. 150 (1983) intro-
duced by the Legislative Council on February 23, 1983. Analysis provided in the bill
by the Legislative Reference Bureau indicates the following changes are proposed:
I. It requires courts to provide adoptive parents with the child's medical
and genetic record at the time of adoption.
2. It requires the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) to
provide adult adoptees and others whose parents' rights have been terminated,
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ing information beyond medical and genetic data.252
Statutes of several other states illustrate the range of data
possibly included in the term. Connecticut, for example,
lists the following: age of birth parent at time of birth; heri-
tage, which includes nationality, ethnic background, and
race; number of years of school completed at the time of the
birth; general physical appearance in terms of height,
weight, color of hair, eyes, skin; talents, hobbies and special
interests; existence of other children; reasons for placement;
religion; occupation; health history of biological relatives;
manner in which plans were made regarding adoptive place-
ment; and the relationship between the birth parents.253
Other states simply refer to health information. 4 Although
agencies currently compile a comprehensive ifie, neither the
law nor the administrative rules indicate whether this infor-
mation can be obtained upon demand or whether the proce-
dure for access to identifying information must be followed.
Secondly, many requesters are seeking information con-
and the adoptive parents, guardians, legal custodians and offspring of those
persons, and adoption agencies, with the medical and genetic information it
has on file about those persons. The department is not permitted to charge for
the disclosure of this information.
3. Currently, adoptees 21 years of age and over and others whose parents'
rights have been terminated may require DHSS to conduct a search for their
birth parents in an attempt to obtain permission to disclose their identity to the
requester. If the birth parents do not consent to the disclosure, the department
may not disclose any information about a birth parent to the requester unless
the parent has been dead for at least a year and the other birth parent has
consented to the disclosure. This bill provides, in addition, that if a person's
birth parents have refused to permit the disclosure of their identity, DHSS may
disclose to the requester whatever social history information it has on file
about the person without disclosing the identity of the parents.
4. The bill permits adoption agencies to disclose to a child's adoptive par-
ent or to an adult adoptee, upon request, any social history or medical and
genetic information it has on file relating to the child, without disclosing the
identity of the child's birth parents or of health care provider to the child or the
child's birth parents.
5. The bill requires DHSS to provide adoption agencies with a form on
which to collect the medical and genetic information they must provide to the
court when a child's parents' rights are terminated.
Id.
252. See Wis. STAT. § 48.432(3)(a) (1981-82) (the statute refers only to medical
and genetic information being released upon request).
253. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45.68e (West Supp. 1983-1984).
254. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.46 (West 1982).
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cerning biological siblings.2 5 Release of information re-
garding brothers and sisters has not yet been addressed. But
this information is particularly important to middle-aged
adoptees because siblings represent their key link to the past.
Finally, the law does not delineate the adoption agency's
role in disclosing information. Agencies usually are the best
resource for the information being sought. 6 Agencies have
the greatest familiarity with the parties and records in-
volved.257 Also, they may be more efficient in compiling and
disseminating information. They offer the further advantage
of being a resource for counselling and education of the par-
ties involved. In the past, agencies have had varying poli-
cies on disclosure. Some have released all available
information upon request except the identity of the birth
parents.25 9 DHSS, however, has interpreted chapter 359 to
mean that the Adoption Information Search Program is the
exclusive avenue for adoptees and others seeking access to
birth records. 260 This stance has eliminated an informal, in-
expensive and often fruitful option for those searching for
information. It also mandates the cumbersome process of
transferring all agency records to DHSS where they may be
more difficult and costly for the adoptee to retrieve.
VI. CONCLUSION
Resolving the sealed versus open adoption records ques-
tion requires close scrutiny of and sensitivity to the needs of
all parties to adoption. Adult adoptees, no longer needing
the protection of secrecy, seek information needed for their
255. Interview with DHSS staff, supra note 237.
256. Comment, A Step Toward Resolving, supra note 23, at 377-78. See also
Klibonoff, supra note 76, at 197-98.
257. Comment, A Step Toward Resolving, supra note 23, at 377.
258. Id. at 378.
259. THE CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION
SERVICE (1976), recommends that agencies collect and disclose nonidentifying infor-
mation. See also Comment,A Step Toward Resolving, supra note 23, at 358, in which
the author states that most agencies have sealed identifying information by policy
decisions in the absence of statutory restrictions (citing M. JONES, THE SEALED
ADOPTION RECORD CONTROVERSY: REPORT OF A SURVEY OF AGENCY POLICY,
PRACTICE AND OPINION 13-14 (1976)).
260. Telephone interview with Michael Becker, Director of Office on Children,
Youth and Families, Department of Health and Social Services (Oct. 3, 1983).
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physical and emotional well-being. Birth parents' privacy,
however, deserves respect and deference. They have made
what is often a painful decision to relinquish their child to
another family. The law protects that decision by erasing
the relationship legally and socially. Committed adoptive
parents have an interest in preserving the family unit they
have nurtured and supported. Courts are not the most satis-
factory forum for balancing these interests when adult
adoptees request the unsealing of their birth records. Legis-
lative changes have been pursued with varying results.
Some states have consistently chosen to retain sealed records
statutes. Others have provided for the release of health and
other data not identifying the birth parent.
Wisconsin is among those states which have recognized
the need for reform, but have not embraced the open records
philosophy. Instead the legislature has chosen to compro-
mise. Although it allows the release of nonidentifying infor-
mation on request, the statute provides for an intermediary
to search for birth parents to obtain consent for the release of
their names. The new law, however, may have unnecessarily
complicated the process for the adoptee. Adult adoptees and
birth parents who want reunions may find bureaucratic bar-
riers to their goal. Not only are there procedural hurdles to
overcome, but limited DHSS staff hours may cause unduly
long delays. Many searchers will still have to resort to na-
tional registries to locate one another.
Those adoptees who obtain access to their medical and
genetic records may find very little information in the file.
The new law depends on cooperation from social workers,
court personnel, and trial court judges to ensure that com-
prehensive court reports are entered in a child's record at the
termination of parental rights hearing. This court report
forms the basis for the useful data an adult adoptee may re-
quest. Yet not all Wisconsin counties are currently enforc-
ing this provision in the law.261
Adoption agencies themselves appear to be the most reli-
able resource for adoptees and birth parents. It is at the
agency level that the most comprehensive data is collected
and compiled. Changing agency policies would mean that
261. Interview with Michael Becker, supra note 260.
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information gathered at this point would be more detailed
and more uniformly available. In addition to its advantage
as an informal resource, agencies also offer the benefit of be-
ing available to assess whether the requester is well-moti-
vated and capable of handling facts which might be
revealed. Likewise, the agency is a resource for professional
counselling services, and, if needed, as an intermediary be-
tween adoptees and birth parents.
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